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In 1992, seventy-eight countries were following World Bank “structural
adjustment” programs. Within these programs, loans are extended to
governments by the World Bank on condition that they agree to under-
take extensive changes in economic policy. Further, “many others had
introduced the same policy frameworks without formal agreement with
the Bank” (Mosley and Weeks 1993, 1583). Although countries follow-ing
formal programs are now the subject of a voluminous literature, the
others are less frequently investigated. In this article I focus on a specific
example and critically assess the success of the “market-led” structural
adjustment adopted by Fiji’s Interim Government between 1987 and 1992
(Cameron 1993). From the perspective of structuralist macroeconomic
theory, I outline the logic behind structural adjustment programs, exam-
ine Fiji’s economic policy between 1987 and 1992, and assess whether that
policy has been compatible with structural adjustment. I then outline the
impact of reform on economic performance and analyze the key con-
straints facing the Fiji economy since 1992.
Structural Adjustment
Over the last fifteen years a transformation in the assessment of the eco-
nomic circumstances facing developing countries has occurred as a con-
sequence of two factors. The first was the resurgence of neoliberal eco-
nomic analysis in the developed market economies, a resurgence that was
mirrored in the developing economies and has prompted widespread
debate about the role of the market versus that of the state in economic
activity. The general conclusion has been that there is a need for less,259
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260 the contemporary pacific • fall 1996more efficient, state intervention. The second factor has been the rapid
economic development of east Asia, development that appeared to gen-
erate “as firm a stylized fact as any in the economics of developing coun-
tries: a sustained movement to an outward-oriented trade regime leads
to a faster growth of both exports and income” (Lal and Rajapatirana
1987, 208).
As a result of these two factors, it became widely accepted in develop-
ment economics that internal and external imbalances in developing coun-
tries were linked to the detrimental rigidities created by excessive govern-
ment intervention in product and factor markets. With such intervention,
the supply side of many economies had become inefficient in terms of
global competitiveness. The most important distortion was the creation
of a bias against external trade. Such a bias hampered the Smithian eco-
nomic principles of widening the division of labor and following compar-
ative advantage, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. Conse-
quently, levels of gross national product were below those possible given
factor endowments and open borders. Government intervention came to
be held responsible for developmental failure because of the impact of
such intervention on trade and output.
The policy agenda advanced by structural adjustment programs ad-
dresses this developmental failure by both seeking to reduce government
intervention and removing any antitrade bias. Structural adjustment pro-
grams instigate economic changes that withdraw the state from inter-
vention in order to increase allocation through markets. The restoration
of internal and external balance is therefore sought in market liberal-
ization. Further, reforms centralize the role of the price mechanism so
that resources can be allocated in line with comparative advantage, per-
mit-ting the optimal use of factor endowments and generating improve-
ments in productivity. The “proper” role of government is to provide a
stable macroeconomic environment, minimize microeconomic interven-
tions, and invest in human capital to compensate for imperfect futures
markets. In short, structural adjustment programs reformulate economic
strategies “in favour of a ‘market-friendly’ approach” that forms the basis
of the new supply-side “consensus” (World Bank 1991a, 1) in the develop-
ment economics profession.
Structural adjustment programs are most commonly carried out by
countries in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. Both institutions provide financial facilities in exchange for
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fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate policies in order to change the pattern
of expenditure and stabilize an economy at a new, lower level of aggre-
gate demand. The World Bank attempts to improve the use of existing
resources while enhancing productive capacity and increasing the level of
aggregate supply. Although independent, the bank and the fund increas-
ingly coordinate their activities, particularly through the use of “cross-
conditionality”: the need of a borrower to reach agreement with both
institutions before either one will advance funds.
It has been widely argued that the structural adjustment programs of
both institutions reflect a standard package of neoclassical economic
policies that differ little between countries (George and Sabelli 1994).
Mosley, Toye, and Harrigan (1991) have demonstrated that this is not the
case for programs agreed with the World Bank. Policy-based lending by
the bank varies in the types of reforms agreed, the sequence in which
reform is carried out, and the extent to which agreed reforms are imple-
mented. Nonetheless, structural adjustment programs do share two inter-
related commitments (World Bank 1989; 1994; World Bank and undp
1989). The first commitment is to a far-reaching economic liberalization
rooted in neoclassical economic theories. The second is to attempting to
ensure that such liberalization is secured through a similar set of eco-
nomic policies: macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, agricul-
tural reform, and public sector restructuring, including financial sector
reform.
[Structural adjustment] reforms attempted to reduce the state’s role in produc-
tion and in regulating private economic activity. They assigned more impor-
tance to exports, especially those from the much-neglected agricultural sector.
And they placed more emphasis on maintaining macroeconomic stability and
avoiding overvalued exchange rates. (World Bank 1994, 34)
The thrust of the reform process is toward advancing a qualitative neo-
classical economic agenda.
Although many countries have agreed to formal structural adjustment
programs, several countries have sought to adjust on their own by pur-
suing “neo-liberal policies without the financial support of the World
Bank” (Mosley and Weeks 1993, 1586). This has been done either be-
cause of an inability to come to terms with the bank or because of a desire
to maintain some independence in economic policy. For comparative pur-
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developing countries that do not use the formal facilities of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the remainder of this
article I present a case study of Fiji.
Economic policy in Fiji, 1987–1992
Policy to 1987
For most of the period since its independence in 1970, Fiji has pursued a
development strategy based on seeking to secure full employment through
the continued use of the country’s natural resources. In particular, the
government continued the country’s historical reliance on sugar produc-
tion while encouraging tourism as a basis for economic diversification.
Although both activities can be subject to forces beyond the control of
government, such as weather and foreign economic conditions, the im-
pact of international economic conditions on sugar production was re-
duced because of quota arrangements with both the United States and the
European Community. The quotas allowed Fiji to sell significant amounts
of sugar at prices that were both higher and more stable than the world
price.
In addition to the two dominant economic activities of sugar and tour-
ism, other resource-based activities included fisheries, timber, ginger, and
gold. In contrast, the manufacturing sector has been small in size and sub-
ordinate in terms of its economic importance. The limited industrial
development that occurred between 1970 and 1987 was largely based on
import-substitution, and the economy was subject to a regulatory regime
deploying quota, license, and tariff protection. The postcolonial gov-
ernment also established a number of state-owned enterprises. However,
by 1991 manufacturing accounted for only 12.3 percent of gross domestic
product. The lower priority attached to industrialization partly re-flected
the widely shared view that very small economies had only limited indus-
trialization potential. It also reflected an emphasis on employment-gener-
ating labor-intensive activities as a means of maintaining communal
relations between a population almost equally divided between indige-
nous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.
With only limited industrialization, it is incorrect to state that post-
colonial governments sought to pursue “a comprehensive . . . program of
import substitution” (Elek, Hill, and Tabor 1993, 752). It is debatable
akram-lodhi • structural adjustment in fiji 263whether the government’s five-year development plans influenced the exe-
cution of detailed policy. Similarly, the economy has always had a com-
paratively high degree of openness to the international economy. Fiji has
relied on a vast range of imported wage, intermediate, and capital goods
to meet the demands of consumers and firms, imports that have been
largely paid for by exports. Government intervention was not witnessed
in stringent development planning and attempts at autarky. Rather, the
most important intervention by the government has been regulation:
product and factor markets have been guided by the Prices and Incomes
Board, by ministries such as the Departments of Transport, Communica-
tion, Trade and Commerce, and Employment and Industrial Relations,
and by the Native Land Trust Board. A more appropriate characteriza-
tion of postcolonial Fiji might be to describe it as a hybrid: an economy
with elements of dirigisme that has nonetheless been deeply insinuated
into the world economy (Narayan 1984).
It has been argued that compared to other lower middle income coun-
tries “Fiji’s long-term economic performance has been disappointing”
(Elek, Hill, and Tabor 1993, 750). Granted, real per capita gross domestic
product was no higher in 1985 than in 1979 following four years when the
economy contracted by 0.6 percent per year. However, over the period
from 1972 to 1981, Fiji did witness real growth in gross domestic product
of 5.1 percent per year. Further, in the early 1980s “Fiji was undergoing a
multi-dimensional crisis” (Cameron 1994, 420) consisting of drought,
cyclones, the 1979 oil-price rise, and extreme turbulence in international
sugar prices. Perhaps a more nuanced assessment would be that the good
macroeconomic performance that accompanied the first decade of inde-
pendence and “removed some of the worst elements of the colonial inher-
itance” (Cameron 1994, 420) was not sustained through the first half of
the 1980s.
The government was aware that the economy faced significant chal-
lenges. In late 1986 the finance minister began to chart a transformation
in Fiji’s economic policy by announcing the creation of in-bond manufac-
turing sites, commonly known as export processing zones or tax-free fac-
tories. This policy initiative was meant to be the first decisive step in a
shift in industrial policy away from import substitution and toward ex-
port promotion, a shift that had had an extremely long gestation period,
having been first mooted in Development Plan 6 published in 1970 (Chan-
dra 1985). However, the 1986 shift in industrial policy became a much
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by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka in May and September 1987.
Politics and Economics in the Wake of the Coups
The coups had major political and economic ramifications. In terms of
politics, following the second coup the now Brigadier-General Rabuka de-
clared Fiji a republic and assumed the position of head of state. Subse-
quently, two months of negotiations resulted in the appointment of the
military-backed civilian-based Interim Government on 5 December 1987.
Former Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau was appointed presi-
dent of the republic by Brigadier-General Rabuka. Formally, power in the
Interim Government resided in the office of the president, in that the gov-
ernment operated under a system of presidential decrees. However, decrees
were presented to the president by a Council of Ministers; the effective
source of power in the Interim Government was the Cabinet, led by
former prime minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who returned as prime
minister despite his electoral defeat in April 1987. The Interim Govern-
ment remained in power for just under five years; for much of the period
between December 1987 and May 1992 Fiji was governed by this un-
elected civilian government ruling by decree.
Concurrent with political change, the 1987 coups caused a severe eco-
nomic shock. Tourism dropped by some 36 percent, while farmers dis-
rupted the sugarcane harvest in protest. Given that some 40 percent of
budget revenues came from customs and excise duties and reflected the
performance of tradables, the impact of the coups was quickly experi-
enced by the government: in 1986–87 the budget deficit increased by over
12.5 percent to stand at almost 8 percent of gross domestic product. In
response, the newly appointed Interim Government “pinpointed industri-
alization as being of prime importance to Fiji’s future development”
(Chandra 1989, 170) in that it could both stabilize and expand the econ-
omy and act as a possible counter to political unrest. While the role of
industrialization in Fiji’s development was magnified after 1987, consis-
tent with more tentative precoup initiatives by successive Alliance Party
governments, the model of industrialization that was advanced was geared
toward export promotion.
In transforming the orientation of economic policy, the Interim Gov-
ernment was not only claiming to respond to the higher costs, excess
capacity, and resource misallocations associated with Fiji’s attempt at im-
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of Development Plan 7 (Fiji Ministry of Finance Central Planning Office
1979). It was also “responding both to the international trend towards
economic liberalization and export-oriented industrialization and to spe-
cific advice from its consultants and international agencies” (Chandra
1989, 170). This advice, which predated the coups, had argued that Fiji
needed to radically improve its export potential by reducing unit labor
costs if it were to continue to grow (World Bank 1986; Fiji Employment
and Development Mission 1984). That this advice was fully taken on
board by the Interim Government was repeatedly made clear by senior
ministers. For example, in a major speech in 1991 the prime minister
stated,
[O]ur economic policies indicate that we have woken up to the challenges of
competing in the international environment. We are no longer content to hide
behind high tariff barriers . . . . Growth will be hampered unless steps are
taken to encourage efficiency and . . . encouraging competition from abroad is
one way of doing just that. . . . Government has . . . a strong and practical
commitment to making our economy efficient and outward oriented, and also
to strengthening the role of the private sector. (Mara 1991, 6, 10)
Given that much of the advice underpinning this analysis had been
received prior to the coups, the transformation in Fiji’s economic policy
that occurred after 1987 should be seen not so much as a dramatic break
with the past as a stark confirmation of policy processes that were already
in train prior to the coups.
As presented by ministers, policy transformation had as its central
themes the slackening or cessation of government controls in the econ-
omy and the promotion of exports in order to boost competitiveness and
growth. Macroeconomic stabilization, external trade liberalization, and
internal deregulation were implemented to facilitate economic restructur-
ing and transform Fiji from an “inward looking, high tax, and slow
growth economy to a dynamic outward looking, low tax and high growth
economy” (Fiji Ministry of Finance 1991). Macroeconomic stabilization,
external trade liberalization, and internal deregulation are areas similar to
those noted earlier as forming the core policy commitments in structural
adjustment programs sponsored by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Efforts to centralize the role of the price mechanism
without the formal agreement of either the bank or the fund led one ob-
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as market-led structural adjustment (Cameron 1993). I turn now to the
policy components of Fiji’s market-led structural adjustment.
Macroeconomic Stabilization
The increase in the budget deficit brought about by the collapse in tour-
ism and the disruption of the sugarcane harvest necessitated the stabiliza-
tion of the economy, which the government achieved by implementing
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies. On the fiscal side, the govern-
ment imposed a 15 percent wage cut on all civil servants. It also slashed
public investment in real terms by a third. Demand was brought under a
tight rein. On the monetary side, the cessation of concessional credit, a
sharp fall in inflows of direct foreign investment, and the flight of an esti-
mated f$120 million out of the country in 1987 and 1988 all served to col-
lapse the availability of foreign financial resources. The government
responded by financing 90 percent of the budget deficit from domestic
borrowing. Further, the central bank, the Reserve Bank of Fiji, severely
restricted the availability of private sector credit and imposed additional
restrictions on outflows of foreign exchange. The combined impact was
to limit the growth of the money supply in the immediate postcoup period
to only 4 percent on an annual basis at the end of 1987.
However, undoubtedly the most important component of the Interim
Government’s stabilization package was a devaluation of the Fiji dollar.
The value of the Fiji dollar is fixed by the Reserve Bank relative to a
weighted basket of the currencies of Fiji’s principal trading partners. A
two-stage devaluation in June and October 1987 reduced the value of the
dollar in nominal terms by some 33 percent. Combined with the decline in
real wages, the impact was to bring about a fall in the effective ex-change
rate of almost 28 percent in the period from 1986 to 1988. The effect was
to further reduce the attractiveness of capital flight and to im-prove the
competitive position of capacity underused as a consequence of the coups.
The stabilization of the economy was undoubtedly impressive. Al-
though constant per capita gross domestic product shrank by over 7 per-
cent in 1987, and inflation peaked at 12 percent in November 1988, by
mid-1988 the economy was recovering. Economic growth for 1989 was an
impressive 12.5 percent. Recovery was fueled by a gradual expansion of
private sector credit: as a consequence of good receipts from sugar sales,
the Reserve Bank allowed the rate of growth of the money supply to pick
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of tourists, and government revenues increased, not only reducing the
government borrowing requirement to a manageable 3 percent of gross
domestic product by 1990, but also permitting 1987 public sector wage
cuts to be restored in real terms in 1988 and 1989. Finally, the recovery in
official reserves needed to sustain stabilization was brought about in two
ways. First was an increase in inward foreign direct investment from
us$6.3 million in 1987 to us$48.6 million in 1988 and us$59.4 million in
1990 (International Monetary Fund 1994, 353). This recovery was a con-
sequence of the tax-free factory scheme. Second, foreign assistance
returned, if from different sources such as France and Malaysia.
However, the government did not stop at stabilization. It turned eco-
nomic crisis into an opportunity to cement macroeconomic reform through
a restructuring of Fiji’s fiscal stance. In the 1990 budget the finance minis-
ter felt confident enough to cut income tax rates by 20 percent, leaving
the highest rate at 40 percent. At the same time exemptions and allow-
ances were increased. To compensate for the loss of revenue and to ease
the transition to a new value-added tax, existing indirect taxes were
raised, and the tax base was broadened by imposing income tax on some
forty thousand peasants for the first time. Plans to “corporatize” several
state-owned enterprises also moved forward. While this effort to force
state-owned enterprises to follow commercial practices was envisaged as
a prelude to privatization, the more immediate positive impact, from the
government’s point of view, was on its own accounts.
In the Interim Government’s final 1992 budget, further cuts in income
tax and corporation tax were announced: the number of income tax
bands was to be reduced from ten to three, corporation tax was to be sim-
plified, income tax thresholds were to be increased, and the requirement
that those below the threshold pay tax was to be ended. Finally, despite
the resignation of the Interim Government prior to the May 1992 election,
a key policy initiative, the much-debated value-added tax, was introduced
on schedule in July by the newly elected government.
Trade Liberalization
The most visible aspect of the Interim Government’s adjustment program
was its liberalization of external trade, which has transformed Fiji’s
economy in terms of policies toward both exports and imports. Looking
first at policies toward exports, the introduction of in-bond manufactur-
Table 1. Commodities requiring import licenses in Fiji, prior to 1989 and in 
1991
Pre-1989 1991
Baked beans (canned) Butter
Brown rice Canned fish
Butt hinges Coffee
Barrel bolts Corned Meat
Butter Lubricants
Canned fish Hydraulic fluids
Cement and clinker Milk and cream
Cheese and other dairy products Rice
Chili sauce and paste Seed potatoes
Coffee
Corned meat of bovine animals
Crown cork
Dried leguminous vegetables
Eggs
Electric cables and wiring clips
Flour and sharps
Incense sticks and blends
Knitted fabrics
Lamb and mutton
Live poultry
Louvre window frames
Margarine
Matches
Meat and edible offals
Mild steel bars and rods
Multiwall paper bags
Noodles
Onions
Orange products
Pineapple products
Polypropylene bags and fabrics
Poultry products
Powdered milk
Prawns
PVC pipes and sheeting
Ropes of manmade fibre
Shirts
Spirits and liquors
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Table 1. Continued
Pre-1989 1991
Steel shelving and rackings
Sweetened forage
Tea
Tomato products
Tubes and pipes of iron or steel
Vegetable ghee
Wet cell batteries
Wick-type kerosene stoves
Wood screws
Source: Adapted from Elek, Hill, and Tabor 1993, 760.ing sites led to their quickly becoming an important feature of Fiji’s
industrial and export policy (Akram-Lodhi 1992). Tax-free factories re-
ceived substantial tax concessions in exchange for a commitment to ex-
port 95 percent of output. Such concessions were available to both local
and international firms, which were thus placed in a similar regulatory
regime. Of the 119 firms engaged in in-bond manufacturing by the end of
1992, 70 percent were in garment production. Although garment exports
had started to increase prior to the introduction of in-bond
manufacturing, the performance of the garment factories was impressive:
by 1990 garment export production constituted over 55 percent of
manufacturing production, over 22 percent of total domestic exports,
and over 37 percent of all manufacturing employment (Akram-Lodhi
1992; Elek, Hill, and Tabor 1993). Such exports were, of course,
supported by the devaluation of the Fiji dollar. Almost half of those
firms operating tax-free factories in 1992 were international corpo-
rations, if from a narrow group of countries. Economic changes in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in particular forced garment producers from
those countries to seek to locate production off-shore in countries such
as Fiji. In order to attract such businesses, the Interim Government eased
and simplified approval procedures for direct foreign investment and at
the same time expanded the resources available to the Fiji Trade and
Investment Board so that it could enhance its capacity to attract such
investment.
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licensing. The licensing regime used to sustain import-substitution was
largely eradicated as Fiji switched to an open general license scheme cov-
ering most wage, intermediate, and capital goods. The scale of deregula-
tion is demonstrated in Table 1, which contrasts the extent of import
licensing prior to 1989, when more than 47 commodities required
licences, with that of 1991, when only 9 commodities did.
The government replaced import licensing with a simplified structure
of tariffs. Maximum tariff levels were progressively cut, so that by 1992
most imports had a fiscal duty of 30 percent attached to them. Moreover,
the last budget of the Interim Government offered the prospect of a max-
imum tariff of only 20 percent in 1993, in part because of the introduction
of a value-added tax designed to assist in reducing the dependence on cus-
toms levies for revenue. For specific items the cuts went further faster.
Internal Deregulation
External trade liberalization was accompanied by extensive internal de-
regulation. The overall thrust of the changes involved a reduction in bar-
riers to entry in domestic markets, thereby potentially enhancing compet-
itive discipline. Obviously, the shift to an open general license scheme
was an important component of a reduction in barriers to entry, as were
the reduction and simplification of customs duties and corporation taxes.
However, internal deregulation went further than these obvious changes.
With the effective end of five-year plans, most detailed sectoral economic
targeting was eliminated, reducing the nonmarket, linkage-enhancing
planning requirements that had been placed on some firms. Enhance-
ment of the role of markets was furthered by the elimination of price
controls on a range of items, and the need for price controls was to some
extent eliminated by the introduction of enforceable trading standards
by the Ministry of Trade and Commerce in the last year of the Interim
Government.
Barriers to market entry were further diminished by attempts at re-
forming state-owned enterprises. Under the auspices of the Public Enter-
prise Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the govern-
ment corporatized several large public enterprises. The effect was to place
some state-owned enterprises on the same legal and commercial basis as
private sector firms, with the government theoretically committed to
simply acting as the majority shareholder. Corporatization led some firms
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theory, the process opened up protected markets to competition. How-
ever, only one seriously unprofitable firm was closed, while industrial
action in several corporatized companies resulted in the kind of govern-
ment intervention that corporatization was supposed to prevent.
The final major internal deregulation initiative of the Interim Govern-
ment was to enhance the flexibility of the labor market. In 1991 statutory
wage guidelines were abolished in order to strengthen the position of
employers in establishing the relationship between pay and productivity.
Changes to labor legislation followed, substantially increasing govern-
ment intervention in the internal affairs of unions. An organizational
framework within which unions could operate was imposed, the proce-
dures under which industrial action could be taken came under govern-
ment regulation, and large financial penalties for lack of compliance with
the new legislation were introduced. The effect of these changes was to
make it less likely that the 80 percent of the formally employed labor
force that belonged to trade unions, professional associations, or other
similar organizations would assert their right to withdraw their labor.
The Extent of Policy Change
The policy changes introduced by the Interim Government were clearly
wide ranging. It is possible to quantitatively assess the extent of macro-
economic policy change using a methodology recently developed by the
World Bank (World Bank 1994). In its report on structural adjustment in
Africa, the bank developed an index of change in macroeconomic policies
that examines specific changes in fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate pol-
icies. On the basis of the size of the change in each indicator a numerical
score is assigned to given quantitative criteria. A higher score indicates a
change in policy toward enhancing the role of markets.
The bank used this methodology on a sample of 29 sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries of differing income levels and differing periods of adjust-
ment. It concluded that “the evidence indicates that the group of
countries with the largest improvement in macroeconomic policies consis-
tently had the largest increase in macroeconomic performance” (World
Bank 1994, 264). Given the strong correlation claimed by the bank and
the wide extent to which it has applied the methodology, I used the meth-
odology to assess whether there had been a significant change in Fiji’s
macroeconomic policies between the  pre-adjustment period of 1982–1986
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Table 2. Macroeconomic policy change in Fiji, between the periods 1982–1986 
and 1989–1992
Percentage
change Score Assessment
1 Fiscal balance excluding grants −41.72 1 Improvement
2 Total revenue −40.02 0 No change
3 Overall change in fiscal policy n/a 1 Improvement
4 Seigniorage 4−2.00 1 Improvement
5 Inflation −41.42 0 No change
6 Overall change in monetary policy n/a 0.5 Improvement
7 Real effective exchange rate −45.93 3 Large improvement
8 Overall change in macroeconomic policy n/a 1.5 Large improvement
Notes: Changes in budget deficits, tax revenues, and seigniorage are expressed as
percentages of gross domestic product. Changes in inflation and the real effective
exchange rate are expressed as simple percentages. Scores are assigned on the basis
of the size of the percentage change. A simple average generates a composite score
of overall change in macroeconomic policy.
Sources: International Monetary Fund 1994, 350–353 for data; World Bank 1994,
260–261 for methodology.and the adjustment period of 1989–1992 (Table 2).
Looking first at fiscal policy, between the two periods the fiscal deficit,
excluding grants, declined by 1.72 percent of gross domestic product.
Within the terms of the bank’s methodology this is considered an im-
provement in policy. In terms of tax revenue, the adjustment period wit-
nessed an increase in tax revenue equal to 0.02 percent of gross domestic
product. Despite the shift in the structure of taxation from direct and
tariff-based taxes to value-added tax, the bank would consider this mild
improvement in revenue collection insufficient to demonstrate a signifi-
cant increase in the quality of the fiscal effort. The overall change in fiscal
policy is obtained by adding the scores, with a score of 1 indicating an
improvement.
Turning next to monetary policy, the change in seigniorage is obtained
by using a version of the Fischer equation (Fischer 1982). Seigniorage
assesses the extent to which the central bank monetizes government defi-
cits, and is calculated from the increase in the growth of the money stock
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Fiji seigniorage decreased by 2 percent of gross domestic product between
the reference periods. Such a performance indicates increasing rigor in
monetary policy and would be assigned a score of 1. Between 1982–1986
and 1989–1992 the average rate of inflation rose by 1.42 percent. Such a
deterioration in inflation would not be considered serious, and a score of
0 would be assigned. The overall change in monetary policy is obtained
by averaging the score; the score of 0.5 indicates an improvement in mon-
etary policy.
In terms of exchange-rate policy, as a consequence of devaluation be-
tween 1982–1986 and 1989–1992 the real effective exchange rate im-
proved by 45.93 percent. This large improvement in policy is assigned a
score of 3.
Averaging the scores for the changes in fiscal, monetary, and exchange-
rate policy gives an overall score of 1.5, which represents a “large im-
provement in macroeconomic policies” (World Bank 1994, 262). The basis
of this improvement is primarily devaluation, with fiscal policy playing a
supporting role. The weak link in Fiji’s adjustment has apparently been
monetary policy, but even there policy has improved.
It could be argued that because macroeconomic policies have been but
one part of a much larger policy package, market-led structural adjust-
ment has been much more extensive than Table 2 indicates. However,
despite the scale of change, it is unclear how adjustment has affected the
process of growth and development in Fiji. Such an assessment is carried
out in the following section.
The Impact of Adjustment on Growth
Table 3 provides a range of economic indicators to allow the record of the
period of structural adjustment in Fiji under the Interim Government to
be compared with that of the immediate precoup period. To attempt to
even out the impact of cyclical phenomena, the data have been pooled so
that period averages for the calendar years 1982 through 1986 and 1989
through 1992 can be estimated. Neither the year of the coups, 1987, nor
the immediate catch-up year of 1988 has been used in calculating the
period averages in an effort to garner a better understanding of the rela-
tive economic performance of the economy under adjustment. Making
some alterations to the years included in the period averages does not
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Table 3. Fiji economic indicators, 1982–1986 and 1989–1992
1982–1986 1989–1992 1992
Annual rates of growth
1 Real GDP −31.26 −25.08 1−22.80
2 Real per capita GDP 3−0.76 −23.88 1−21.30
3 Industrial production 3−3.81 −27.40 12−4.63
4 Agricultural production 3−5.05 −22.84 1−23.24
5 All exports 3−6.05 −12.53 1−23.50
6 Prices 3−5.03 −26.45 1−24.89
Annual shares of gross domestic product
7 Private capital formation −10.48 −25.72 1−25.91
8 Merchandise exports −19.40 −29.92 1−29.17
9 Current account 3−3.52 2−0.57 n/a
10 Foreign direct investment 3−3.57 −24.56 n/a
11 External debt −36.16 −28.60 1−21.00
Notes: Rates of growth are simple arithmetic averages of annual growth; rows 1,
2, 4 and 11 include government estimates; rows 5 and 7 include author’s esti-
mates; row 8 includes imf estimates; rows 9 and 10 compare 1982–1986 with
1989–1991.
Sources: Fiji Bureau of Statistics various issues for rows 1, 2, 4, 7, and 10; Fiji
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 1993, 34 for row 11; International
Monetary Fund 1994, 350–353 for rows 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9; World Bank 1993,
142–145 for row 11.shift the direction of change but affects only the magnitude of change,
and then only to a small degree. Table 3 also presents data for 1992, per-
mitting comparison of the entire adjustment period with the terminal
phase of the Interim Government. This in turn provides some initial indi-
cation of the extent to which the adjustment process has fostered the
emergence of a pattern of growth that is markedly different from the one
in place prior to the coups.
Examining first row 1 of Table 3, the period of adjustment witnessed a
rate of growth in real gross domestic product some four times greater
than in the pre-adjustment period. The improvement is even more marked
when trends in real per capita gross domestic product are examined. The
decline of −0.76 percent per year between 1982 and 1986 was an important
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ization. The rapid achievement of real per capita growth in gross domes-
tic product of 3.88 per year between 1989 and 1992 could be taken as an
important indicator of the speed by which the adjustment process trans-
lated into improved economic performance.
Row 4 of Table 3 indicates that the basis of improved performance was
not rooted in Fiji’s traditional leading economic sector. The rate of growth
of agricultural production was cut by almost 45 percent during the ad-
justment period. Improved performance came from elsewhere. Row 3 indi-
cates that part of the improvement came from an increase in the rate of
growth of aggregate industrial production of more than 3.5 percent per
year during the pre-adjustment and adjustment periods. Of greater
importance, however, was the pickup in the export of goods and services.
Row 5 shows that the rate of growth of exports doubled from 6.05 per-
cent per year in the pre-adjustment period to 12.53 percent per year dur-
ing the years 1989 to 1992. Of particular importance here was growth in
merchandise exports. Row 8 indicates that the merchandise export share
of gross domestic product rose from over 19 percent in the years 1982–
1986 to almost 30 percent during the adjustment period. This increase
was the fruit of a policy-driven attempt to promote structural change
through export-oriented industrialization, including the introduction of
tax-free factories, which led to extremely rapid increases in the produc-
tion of garments for export. By 1990 alone garments comprised 57 per-
cent of manufacturing production. There is consistency between rows 3,
5, and 8, insofar as the most important subset in each is garment produc-
tion (Akram-Lodhi 1992).
The impact of the tax-free factory scheme is further highlighted by the
rise in inward direct foreign investment, whose share of gross domestic
product was 27 percent higher under adjustment than in the pre-adjust-
ment period. The increase in international investment flows directed into
Fiji might be taken as a sign of confidence in the irreversible nature of the
change in Fiji toward a liberal, export-oriented economic regime. It also
indicates the extent to which trade and investment are complementary
phenomena.
Confidence has been further fostered by reliable macroeconomic man-
agement. Row 11 indicates the decline in the debt-service ratio between
1982–1986 and 1989–1992, which was not fueled by growth alone. By the
end of 1992, government borrowing constituted a manageable 5.3 percent
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amortization. Sustainable fiscal policies were accompanied by similar
monetary policies. Although the average rate of growth of prices during
the period of adjustment exceeded that of the pre-adjustment period, the
low figure for 1992 might indicate that the inflationary impact of cur-
rency devaluation was eroding over time. Certainly, while the annual rate
of growth of the money supply had stabilized at around 14 percent by
1992, such a rate might well have been compatible with the rapid growth
in real gross domestic product that Fiji experienced between 1989 and
1992. Further, rapid economic growth, the reduction in external debt, and
stable monetary growth all pointed to a government that was not printing
money simply to finance its deficit. Rather, fiscal and monetary policy
point to internal balance being a prime policy objective.
The impact of these policies on the constraints facing Fiji’s economy is
vividly illustrated in row 9, which demonstrates that the small current
account deficit of the pre-adjustment period was further reduced during
1989–1992. Provided direct foreign investment flows continue, Fiji may be
close to achieving external balance. The reduction in the current account
deficit would be taken by many orthodox economists as evidence that
external balance is possible if fueled by a strong export sector, by an
appropriate exchange rate, and by reliable macroeconomic management.
On first impression it would appear from Table 3 that market-led
structural adjustment in Fiji has not only stabilized the economy, but has
also fostered the emergence of an economic structure that promotes inter-
nal and external balance because of a strong orientation toward manufac-
turing tradables. However, despite the evidence presented in Table 3 these
results should be treated with caution, for reasons made clear in the fol-
lowing section.
Adjustment and the Limits to Growth in Fiji
Despite the evidence presented so far, it can be argued that the perfor-
mance of Fiji’s economy between 1989 and 1992 demonstrated some fun-
damental strategic weaknesses that adjustment did nothing to address.
Some would argue that adjustment may have exacerbated major struc-
tural problems in Fiji’s economy. In order to demonstrate the validity of
these statements, it is necessary to delve behind the data from the perspec-
tives of first, the methodology used to assess adjustment; second, the im-
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ment on demand constraints.
Methodology
The assessment of the impact of adjustment on economic performance
presented in the preceding sections is crucial to the claim that adjustment
improves growth. However, although it is a deliberately orthodox anal-
ysis of adjustment, the evidence presented in those sections has three
methodological problems, only one of which is specific to Fiji.
The first methodological problem centers on the need to devise a base
for comparison in order to assess adjustment. In the earlier sections, the
base for comparison is the pre-adjustment period. However, such an
approach, no matter how commonly used in orthodox analyses of adjust-
ment, is methodologically inadequate because the wider economic envi-
ronment within which adjustment occurs may differ from that of the pre-
adjustment period. While comparison with previous performance may be
a useful indicator, it is not a sufficient one on which to base judgment.
A second methodological problem concerns the evidence that quanti-
fies the extent of change in macroeconomic policy. The bank’s allocation
of scores to percentage changes requires the division of percentage
changes into discrete groups. Yet, in making such a division the bank’s
methodology offers no rationale that is independent of the sample (World
Bank 1994, 260–261). The division is arbitrary, as is the entire scoring pro-
cedure. Therefore, despite the assertions of the bank, on the basis of this
methodology a relationship between policy change and growth is not
established. Consequently, it has yet to be proved that changes in Fiji’s
economic policy facilitated growth.
A third methodological problem is specific to Fiji. In Table 3 the most
impressive statistic is the pickup in the rate of growth of real per capita
gross domestic product from –0.76 percent in 1982–1986 to 3.88 percent
in 1989–1992. Although the rate of growth for 1992 was, at 1.3 percent,
not nearly as impressive as the average for the adjustment period as a
whole, it still appears to represent a significant improvement. However,
that appearance is misleading. The increase in the rate of growth of real
per capita gross domestic product masks a rapid slowdown in the rate of
growth of the population. At the end of 1992 the estimated total popula-
tion of Fiji was 753,754. The rate of growth of the population between
1976 and 1986 was estimated to be 2 percent per year. For the period
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cent, to stand at 1.2 percent per year. For the period 1990–1991 there was
a further cut of more than 30 percent, reducing the rate of growth of the
population to only 0.8 percent per year. This decline is the result of the
out-migration that occurred in the wake of the coups. Between May 1987
and December 1989, 22,000 Fiji citizens left the country. Emigration
peaked in 1990; however, in 1992 Fiji citizens were still leaving the coun-
try at the rate of 390 each month. In this context, while growth in gross
domestic product was undoubtedly impressive, it was not altogether sur-
prising. Such an increase could be expected not just for reasons of
improved performance but also for reasons of simple arithmetic. Thus,
certain statistics may exaggerate the extent to which economic perfor-
mance has improved, especially compared to the pre-crisis years of the
1970s. In summary, there are methodological reasons for questioning the
extent to which the improvement in Fiji’s economic performance can be
attributed to adjustment.
Supply Constraints
Fiji faces three major, interrelated, structural problems on the supply side
of the economy. Adjustment did not adequately address these problems,
and it is plausible to argue that the policies of the Interim Government
exacerbated them.
The first supply-side problem concerns the labor force. The substantial
emigration following the coups was primarily of skilled labor (Bedford
1989) and might have been expected to reduce economic efficiency. For
firms to respond to the profit incentives to produce tradables generated
by adjustment, they require access to labor of sufficient skill, whether in
production, distribution, or management. Skilled labor is also necessary
to administer adjustment. By hampering the ability of firms to respond to
incentives and of the state to understand the constraints facing the econ-
omy, loss of skilled labor impedes the development of trade and industry.
Obviously, the Interim Government cannot be held directly responsible
for the out-migration that occurred following the coups. Nevertheless,
such a loss requires a supply-side public policy response. However, the
policy response of the Interim Government to supply-side issues is open
to question. For a start, in the wake of the coups sustained government
intervention was necessary to foster human capital formation. Further, it
can be argued that government intervention was necessary to ensure the
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forward and backward linkages. In enhancing the creation of linkages,
government intervention could have facilitated a supply response appro-
priate to the changed pattern of incentives inherent under adjustment.
Finally, it could be argued that government intervention was required to
ensure provision of the physical infrastructure needed by an economy
shifting toward export promotion.
Given these requirements, it is of interest to note a certain aspect of
government expenditure. Government development expenditure can be
defined as capital and current spending with an explicitly developmental
purpose. In Fiji, this would consist of capital expenditure on eduction,
health, housing, social services, and economic services less administra-
tion, as well as current expenditure on education, health, and sanitation.
In the period 1982–1986 government developmental capital formation
accounted, on average, for only 9.87 percent of government development
expenditure. However, in the period from 1989 to 1991 this decreased to
8.21 percent of government development expenditure, a relative decline in
the share of developmental expenditure accounted for by capital forma-
tion. This decline is all the more striking when placed in the context of a
period when industrial production, exports, and foreign direct investment
all increased dramatically. Further, “public investments . . . had already
been squeezed during the first half of the 1980s” (Elek, Hill, and Tabor
1993, 763). It would seem reasonable to argue that by not devoting ade-
quate resources to developmental capital formation the Interim Govern-
ment was assisting in the creation of conditions under which supply
bottlenecks could emerge to seriously compromise attempts to reform the
economic structure.
The Interim Government did not recognize that its policies might be
fostering the emergence of supply-side problems because of the inade-
quacy of its underlying economic theory. According to the theory implic-
itly accepted by the Interim Government, the decline in government
developmental capital formation should have “crowded in” private
investment. Instead, Table 3 row 7 shows a catastrophic drop in nonfor-
eign private investment of some 54 percent between 1982–1986 and 1989–
1992, a decline that was maintained in 1992. Three aspects of this decline
in private investment are noteworthy. First, it occurred from an already
very low base. Second, it occurred during a period when the rate of
growth of the money supply had stabilized, by its end, at around 14 per-
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straints. Third, the decline was not offset by a corresponding increase in
direct foreign investment. The near collapse in private sector investment is
a major supply-side constraint facing the economy of Fiji. The lower vol-
ume of investment will have had an impact on the aggregate accelerator
and multiplier effects of the investment that did occur. In the process, the
impact of adjustment may have been to reduce national income to less
than what might have been expected given the potential output of the
economy.
Two further points concerning investment are worth noting. First,
the decline in investment in Fiji during a period of adjustment replicates
findings from many sub-Saharan African countries (Mosley, Toye, and
Harrigan 1991). A new axiom may be emerging in development eco-
nomics: structural adjustment cuts investment. In Africa, the reason for
such a cut in investment appears to be that public investment is needed to
attract private investment. Such an explanation might serve as a working
hypothesis for future work on Fiji’s economy. Second, the decline in
investment may be traced directly back to certain peculiar investment dis-
incentives in the tax-free factory scheme that are discussed later.
In addition to the quantity of investment, the policies of adjustment
may have reduced the quality of investment. For a start, doubts have been
raised about the extent to which those foreign investors in Fiji’s rapidly
expanding garment industry originating in quota-restricted countries ex-
porting to developed market economies represented real, as opposed to
formal, investment. Customs investigators from both New Zealand and
the United States visited Fiji in 1991 following rumors that investors in
Singapore and Taiwan were simply using Fiji as a transshipment point in
order to evade quota restrictions. While the charges were not proved, the
possibility of rerouting raises questions about the efficiency of some
investment that resulted from the tax-free factory scheme.
A second point relating to the quality of investment is also a conse-
quence of the tax-free factory scheme. As the data demonstrate, the
scheme was not responsible for a boom in private investment, but it did
capture a significant fraction of the investment that occurred (Akram-
Lodhi 1992), raising doubts concerning the quality of some of that invest-
ment. One of Fiji’s advantages in attracting garment exporters has been
its privileged access to the Australian and New Zealand markets under
the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement
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sparteca has rules of origin criteria that encourage inefficient work prac-
tices in lower value-added market segments in order to increase local
labor costs to the minimum value-added requirements (Akram-Lodhi
1992). Efficiency, reliability, and quality are thus compromised. Inefficient
production processes have been compounded by difficulties in obtaining
skilled middle-level management as a result of the labor supply bottle-
necks that were created following the coups. As a consequence, Elek, Hill,
and Tabor’s assertion that Fiji has “been able to establish a good reputa-
tion as a reliable and high-quality source of garments” (1993, 759) is very
wide of the mark. Rather, Fiji has found it difficult to compete, especially
with low-waged Asian producers of cheaper, lower quality output. The
erosion of Fiji’s special advantages under sparteca, the progressive elimi-
nation of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (gatt) Uruguay Round agreement, and the increased
efficiency of local producers in two important markets, New Zealand and
Australia, all point to long-term problems in the industry. Such problems
reflect the fact that the Interim Government put in place a policy frame-
work that discouraged efficiency-enhancing investment. To some extent,
these problems began to emerge in 1992: the industry underwent a major
contraction, and exports to New Zealand collapsed.
The preceding discussion gives plausible possible explanations of the
origin of the decline in the quantity and quality of private sector invest-
ment. If such explanations are correct, the economic policies of the
Interim Government may be held to be largely responsible for that de-
cline. The Interim Government may have been instrumental in creating
strategic supply-side constraints in Fiji’s economy.
Demand Constraints
The policies of the Interim Government did more than just affect the sup-
ply side. They also had major ramifications for the demand side of Fiji’s
economy. Again, reference can be made to the garment industry.
In attempting to develop the garment industry the Interim Government
sought to create an industry that would compete with low-waged Asian
producers. However, according to one group of consultants in the early
1980s, Fiji was a “genuine high wage economy” (Fiji Employment and
Development Mission 1984, 527). To compete with low-cost Asian pro-
ducers it became necessary to reduce the real wage rates of labor. This
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(Chandra 1989, 173; World Bank 1990). On the fragmentary evidence that
is available, this strategy has been succeeding. In the garment sector itself,
in 1991 workers received only 61 percent of average manufacturing
wages. More generally still, data made available by the Bureau of Statis-
tics demonstrate that in the period following the coups the trend toward
declines in real wages that characterized Fiji through the early 1980s con-
tinued. Between 1987 and 1990 real wages in agriculture, manufacturing,
and services all declined by at least 10 percent (Elek, Hill, and Tabor 1993,
755). Of course, to the Interim Government’s orthodox economic advisers
a distributionally regressive strategy seemed positive because it promoted
a more globally competitive allocation of resources. However, structural-
ist macroeconomics provides an alternative perspective that em-phasizes
the impact of distributional retrogression on aggregate demand.
According to structuralist macroeconomic theory, the shift in income
distribution implied by falling real wages would be expected to lead to a
decline in the share of household purchases of wage goods in economic
activity and a rise in the savings level of the economy as those in receipt of
profits witnessed a rise in their share of the national income (Kaldor
1955). However, these savings would not be mobilized for investment
because of the decline in aggregate demand brought about by falling pur-
chases of wage goods (Kalecki 1971). The result would be an overall cut
in aggregate demand and a contraction of the home market. Evidence
from Kenya, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile all points to
lower wage shares in national income leading to a fall in output and eco-
nomic “stagnation” (Taylor 1991).
Further, the impact of regressive distributional policies can be exacer-
bated by attempts to increase the role of international firms in an econ-
omy. Efforts to promote market entry by international firms through the
use of incentives such as tax-free factory schemes facilitate the entry of
companies that typically operate in markets subject to higher concentra-
tion ratios and are capable of gaining higher margins and lower unit costs
than domestic producers because of their technological and managerial
advantages. Such firm-specific advantages allow the international firm to
remain price competitive even while having higher margins. However, in
practice higher margins and lower unit costs mean that international
firms are able to depress the income share of labor within the firm. This
further restricts the growth of the home market because lower labor
akram-lodhi • structural adjustment in fiji 283shares of total income can reduce aggregate demand (Toporowski 1991).
Finally, in Fiji these policies have been accompanied by policies designed
to increase the degree of spatial concentration in the economy, possibly
limiting the extent of the linkages that are generated to narrow geograph-
ical areas even within a small archipelago (Chandra 1989).
It is thus possible to question the efficacy of the economic policies of
the Interim Government on distributional grounds. In this light, two
other key distributional issues can be mentioned, not because they have
been affected by structural adjustment, for they have not, but because the
Interim Government failed to deal with them even though projected
changes over the remainder of the decade will affect income distribution
and aggregate demand. These issues arise out of questions concerning the
future of sugarcane farming and processing, which together continue to
be a major area of economic activity as the largest single source of
employment, providing 11.5 percent of gross domestic product in 1992.
Sugarcane farming is done primarily by Indo-Fijians on some 22,500
farms. However, the land is not owned by the farmers who operate it, but
rented on long-term leases, often of thirty years’ duration. Out of a total
cultivated area of 1.8 million hectares in Fiji, 1.5 million hectares is com-
munally owned by indigenous Fijians on the basis that this land cannot be
sold. Two distributional issues arise from sugarcane farming. The first is
access to land. The rents paid by leasehold farmers are not determined on
the market, but are regulated by the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant
Act, which set rents equal to 6 percent of the unimproved capital value of
the land. The unimproved capital value of the land is determined every
five years. Comparatively speaking, rents are low as a proportion of crop
value. However, the Act expires in 1997, and farmers with leases that
expire after 1997 have been finding it very difficult to borrow against the
remainder of their leases because it is likely that rents will rise substan-
tially after that year. This has made it difficult for some farmers to main-
tain production and more particularly farm investment, further restricting
the level of aggregate demand in the economy. In a confidential report
that was leaked to the press in Fiji, the World Bank advised moving to
market-determined land rents (World Bank 1991b). However, this too will
substantially reduce the income of many farmers. While the current terms
of access to land may have depressive effects on investment and thence on
aggregate demand, it is likely that the resolution of the problems sur-
rounding access to land will result in a distributional regression among a
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rents will go to both the Native Land Trust Board and the chiefs and com-
moners of the land-owning mataqali, and is thus a transfer. However,
whether such money will be used to fund investment or consumption is
an open question.
The second distributional issue surrounding sugarcane farming con-
cerns the division of gross sugar proceeds between grower and miller.
Currently, farmers receive 70 percent of the gross proceeds. The Fiji Sugar
Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, would like the basis by which pay-
ments are made to be changed in order to facilitate improved productivity
at all stages of production. The need to improve the productivity of the
industry is pressing, because the benefits of Fiji’s quota arrangement
under the sugar protocol of the Lomé Convention, an arrangement which
allows it to sell sugar at the European Union’s internal sugar price, will
start to erode as the union’s internal sugar price falls in the wake of the
December 1992 gatt agreement. The price paid to farmers exporting to
the union will fall by as much as 15 percent by the year 2000, thus reduc-
ing a subsidy received by the industry and estimated to be worth f$90
million in 1992. Over the period 1980–1990 the subsidy received by Fiji as
a result of the sugar protocol has been estimated to be worth 3.72 percent
of gross domestic product. It has been estimated that the impact of trade
liberalization under the 1992 gatt agreement will result in a net welfare
loss in Fiji equivalent to some 2.52 percent of gross domes-tic product
(MacDonald 1994). It has been argued that productivity-enhancing
changes could include a new system of sharing crop proceeds based on
the quality of the crop. The World Bank has also suggested that farmers
should receive only 60 percent of gross proceeds (World Bank 1991b). It
has been further suggested that incentives to improve milling efficiency be
introduced. However, it will be difficult to improve the efficiency of the
4700 farms that operate holdings of less than one hectare and produce on
average less than 50 tons of cane a year. The implication is that some
rationalization of farm production is to be expected over the remainder of
the decade. However, given that smallholdings represent 19 percent of all
farms, this too has wide-ranging distributional implications and could
affect the level of aggregate demand in the economy. It is not surprising
that attempts in November 1989 to change the basis by which sugar pro-
ceeds were divided resulted in widespread resistance by farmers in the
cane fields.
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sugarcane farming in Fiji is apparent. The Interim Government did little
to address this agrarian issue because it strikes at the heart of intercom-
munity relations in the country as a consequence of the terms under
which land is owned and rented. By not addressing the issue the govern-
ment buried problems that could have major implications for the level of
aggregate demand in the economy over the remainder of the decade.
Fiji and the Global Distribution of Wealth
The economic policies of the Interim Government have resulted in both a
deterioration in income distribution and a lack of investment in Fiji.
However, these problems have not just deepened inequitable processes in
Fiji. They have also altered the position of Fiji in the world economy.
Ideally, domestic policies should lead to an improvement in the aggregate
resources available to an economy, in both an absolute and a relative
sense. That such has not occurred in Fiji may be demonstrated with Arri-
ghi’s indicator of the extent to which the relative resources available to a
country have changed in comparison to those resources available to the
wealthiest countries (Arrighi 1991). Arrighi compared a country’s per cap-
ita gross national product to that of the “organic core” of the world econ-
omy. He defined the organic core as those states “that have over the last
half-century . . . occupied the top positions in the global hierarchy of
wealth and . . . have set the standards of wealth which all governments
. . . have sought to attain” (Arrighi 1991, 42). Arrighi did not claim that
per capita gross national product is a valid or reliable indicator of welfare
or productivity. However, he did state that the ratio of per capita gross
national product provides a solid indication of “the command of the
inhabitants of the region . . . over the human and natural resources of the
organic core, relative to the command of the inhabitants of the organic
core over the human and natural resources of that region” (Arrighi 1991,
46). Table 4 presents comparable data for Fiji. It demonstrates that
between the pre-adjustment period of 1982–1986 and the adjustment
period of 1989–1991 the ratio of Fiji’s per capita gross national product to
that of the organic core declined substantially, by more than 30 percent.
The people of Fiji have less command over the resources of the organic
core under structural adjustment, an indicator of the decreasing power of
Fiji in the global economy.
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Table 4. Comparative economic command: Per capita gross national product of 
Fiji and the “organic core,” 1982–1986 and 1989–1991
Fiji “Organic Core” Fiji/organic core (%)
1982–1986 1696 12,999 13.05
1989–1991 1860 20,744 18.97
Notes: Gross national product is in US dollars. The “organic core” consists of
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Finnish data are gross domestic product.
Source: For data, International Monetary Fund 1994, 194–201, 218–221, 258–
263, 318–321, 350–361, 370–375, 540–543, 548–551, 564–569, 680–689,
734–743; for methodology, Arrighi 1991, 39–66.Conclusion
In this paper I have examined market-led structural adjustment in Fiji,
first by looking at the rationale behind structural adjustment programs. I
then reviewed the economic policies of Fiji’s Interim Government between
1987 and 1992. Those policies appear to have been consistent with struc-
tural adjustment programs and represented an acceleration of changes
that predated the coups. I assessed the success of adjustment in Fiji by
detailing a range of economic indicators. Delving behind the data, it is
possible to voice three criticisms of the adjustment record in Fiji.
First, there are major methodological problems involved in linking pol-
icy change to growth. In particular, the decline in the rate of growth of
population renders questionable the orthodox interpretation of standard
economic data. Second, two key supply constraints that have not been
addressed—a lack of skilled labor, and a lack of private investment—
inhibit the capacity of the Fiji economy to respond to the incentives
provided by adjustment. These constraints suggest a need for enhanced
public investment in order to expand economic opportunities. Third, there
are major demand constraints: the continued decline in real wages restricts
the development of the home market and by so doing limits domestic
investment with its attendant multiplier and accelerator effects; and the
increased role of international corporations in the economy can exacer-
bate distributional retrogression. In addition, such retrogression may be
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Taking all of these factors together, it would appear that the market-led
structural adjustment undertaken by the Interim Government between
1987 and 1992 has not removed key constraints on growth in Fiji. Ob-
servers of adjustment will not be surprised by such a conclusion. As Tarp
has noted, “There is little readily accessible written material on the theo-
retical underpinnings of the imf model” designed to stabilize domestic
demand (1993, 56). Further, “the [World] Bank’s policy recommendations
in the area of stimulation of aggregate supply . . . lack a theoretical basis”
(Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991, 93). In following the prevailing ortho-
doxies of international economics, the Interim Government failed to see
that “the corpus of social theory that underpins the design of [structural
adjustment] reforms contains many gaps” (Gulhati 1990, 97). However,
as in so many other cases, the failure of the Interim Government was
more than theoretical: the impact of market-led structural adjustment will
continue to be felt by the people of Fiji—an outcome that may have been
the point of the entire exercise. The nature of the demand and supply con-
straints indicates that the Interim Government, in seeking to adjust,
sought to devalue Fiji’s core productive asset: the literate, skilled, and
resourceful population of Fiji.
* * *
My thanks to John Cameron, David Styan, Ardeshir Sepehri, Mao Yunshi, the
many customers of the Cottage, Suva, and two anonymous referees of this jour-
nal. Any errors and omissions are my own responsibility.
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This article critically assesses the success of market-led structural adjustment in
Fiji. After reviewing the rationale behind structural adjustment programs it
examines the economic policies of Fiji’s Interim Government between 1987 and
1992, demonstrating that such policies were both consistent with structural ad-
justment and represented confirmation of a change in economic policy. The eco-
nomic performance of Fiji under structural adjustment is examined. However, in
delving behind the data the article uncovers both supply and demand constraints
that together suggest an inability to resolve major structural issues facing the
economy. As a consequence, the capacity of the economy to respond to the
changed framework of incentives brought about by structural adjustment is in-
hibited. Market-led structural adjustment has not acted to remove key limita-
tions to economic growth in Fiji.
keywords: Fiji, Pacific island countries, structural adjustment, small island
economies, trade liberalization, international economics
